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Behind friendly lines: enforcing the need for a joint SOF staff officer

Military Review - May 1, 2004

THE EVENTS OF 11 September 2001 and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) have resulted in a significant expansion of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and special operations forces (SOF) roles and missions. At the direction of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the Army has also placed SOCOM in the new and unfamiliar role of a supported combatant command. (1) The combination of expanded roles and missions with a higher demand for SOF assets and capabilities and increased command responsibilities poses a daunting challenge.

SOCOM's expanded roles and missions increase manpower requirements for SOF personnel who can plan at the strategic level. (2) As more SOF operators begin performing strategic planning duties, SOF units risk losing capabilities. (3) Given SOF truths (people are more important than hardware, competent SOF cannot be created or mass-produced in an emergency, and quality over quantity), the expanded requirement for operators and planners presents a dilemma. (4)

How does SOCOM educate enough SOF planners for its expanded mission without compromising its capabilities or disregarding SOF truths? SOCOM cannot simply strip tactical SOF units, already critically short of experienced manpower, to meet the demand for educated strategic planners who can function effectively on a combatant commander's staff or on a joint special operations task force (JSOTF).

SOF field grade officers receive no formal education to prepare them for joint special operations (SO) at the operational level except that obtained in the intermediate service schools (ISSs). This lack of formal joint SO education limits these officers' ability to contribute and integrate SOF capabilities into joint staffs. The Army must address these limitations by introducing SOF officers to joint special operations early in their careers, either through formal joint SO classroom instruction or distance learning, to prepare them for service with regional combatant commanders, theater special operations commands (TSOCs), joint task forces (JTF), JSOTF, or joint staffs. The SOF staff officer must be able to rapidly transition from SOF operator to effective JSOTF staff officer.

Defining the Problem

Joint doctrine is authoritative and followed except when, in the commander's judgment, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. After the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, operational planners at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) tasked Special Operations Command-Central (SOCCENT) to prosecute the opening phase of the campaign in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. After an initial mission analysis, SOCCENT tasked the Middle East-oriented 5th Special Forces Group (SFG) to form a JSOTF, which eventually became known as Task Force (TF) Dagger.

Although the SOCCENT commander's decision appears to have been successful-with much pain and augmentation by Special Operations Command Joint Forces Command (SOCJFCOM) and other SOF units, the decision put the group commander in a role of JSOTF commander, a role for which his position was not doctrinally designed. (5) Joint Publication (JP) 3-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations, states that "the core of the JSOTF staff is normally drawn from the theater SOC [Special Operations Command] staff or existing SOF component with augmentation from other service SOF." (6)

The SOCCENT commander's decision to form the JSOTF with an existing service component impeded operations for the TF Dagger commander by placing him in the unenviable position of planning and integrating major joint operational-level functions and tactical-level service tasks simultaneously. As one former SFG commander noted, this arrangement is the least preferred course of action because the commander does not have an organization of joint staff officers accustomed to working with the combatant commander's staff at the joint operational level. (7)

Doctrine for Army Special Forces (SF) and other SOF is nested in joint doctrine; however, the SFG headquarters is rarely, if ever, manned with joint-qualified staff officers. For example, during operations in Haiti in 1993, when the 3d SFG commander tried to form a temporary JSOTF, he discovered that there were no joint-qualified officers in his headquarters to fill essential positions, thus hindering initial startup. The 3d SFG commander later said, "We thought we could do it all, but found that we could not." (8)

Most SFG or Naval Special Warfare Group staff functions are performed by newly promoted field grade officers with minimal or no joint experience. Some are recent ISS graduates and might have served temporary duty as a company grade officer with a joint headquarters during a previous deployment. Fewer still have attended the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) or participated in JSOTF training exercises hosted by SOCJFCOM. So, what can SOF commanders do to enhance their assigned field grade officers' knowledge of joint operations? The answer is joint SOF education and training.

One senior SOF officer with several previous joint tours noted, "Joint tactics, techniques, and procedures must be learned (education) and practiced (training). Learning can conceivably be done in the service schools; practice must be done in joint training exercises, experimentation, testing, and finally operations." (9)

SOF Individual Training Requirements

According to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, "SOF require a combination of basic military training and specialized skill training to achieve operational proficiency. SOF-specific training includes both individual skill training and extensive unit training to ensure maximum readiness." (10) United States Code, Title 10, Section 167, "Definitions," charges the SOCOM commander with the training of all special operations forces. (11) This training should include interoperability with conventional and other SOF forces, particularly individual SO training, and professional military education. Joint training of SOF is shared with the regional combatant commanders who, through their TSOC, articulate SOF mission-essential tasks supporting theater campaign and security cooperation planning. (12) The sooner SOF officers are educated and trained at the operational and strategic levels of joint operations, the better prepared they will be when they are assigned to a TSOC or other joint staff responsible for SOF integration.

Because SOF can deploy unilaterally or in support of a conventional force at all spectrums of conflict, they must retain the company-level skills they developed before moving into special operations. Not only must company grade officers know SOF mission-essential tasks, they must continue to hone skills for integration into conventional force operations in support of theater objectives. (13)

In August 2002, the Army War College invited 51 representatives from Army major commands, the Army Staff, the Center for Lessons Learned, the Center for Military History, RAND, and other government agencies to discuss their initial impressions of GWOT and to capture lessons learned. One key lesson learned was that "better SOF-conventional integration and more joint training must be executed to husband Army SOF for the many essential missions they will perform in the ongoing war against terrorism." (14)

According to SOCOM Publication 1, Special Operations in Peace and War, "Training and education are the twin pillars of special operations professional development. Training is designed to produce individuals and units that have mastered the tactics, techniques, and procedures through which units accomplish their missions. Through education, individuals learn the art and science of war and peacetime operations and develop military judgment necessary to apply initiative and creativity to the solution of problems and challenges." (15) The focus must be at the operational-strategic level of warfighting in a joint environment. SOF can apply these skill sets directly to campaign planning for the GWOT.

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